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Words and Money, Apology in Capitalism

In Japan the official observation of the forty-eighth "Anniversary of the Conclusion of the War" took place, as it has since the Tokyo Olympics of 1964, in the Japan Hall of the Martial Arts (Nippon Budōkan) on August 15, 1993. The occasion was dedicated to the mourning of approximately 2.3 million dead who were members of the Japanese Army or civilians attached thereto, 300,000 overseas civilian dead, and 500,000 victims of air raids and associated damage (*sensai*). Among the 7200 mourners, two were the invited representatives of the more than fifty thousand dead born in Korea and Taiwan.¹ Before this assembly, which also included Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, representing the "will of the Japanese people" who had "learned the lessons of history" and therefore "forever abandoned war as a means of resolving international conflict," expressed "condolences [*aitō*] to the victims of war and their families in neighboring countries in Asia and in the world over."² Hosokawa, heading the first non-Liberal-Democratic government in some four decades, thus became the first prime minister to acknowledge the suffering of Asian peoples in this setting. Prior to this, on August 10, at the press conference following the announcement of the new coalition cabinet, Hosokawa had made his mark not only through the projection of what was perceived as a youthful, vigorous, and therefore unmistakably clintonesque style, but by

¹Progressive historians contest the use of the figure of three million war dead to suggest the sum total of war dead on the grounds that it only includes Japanese (an example being publicity brochures for the controversial project of a museum dedicated to war memorial; in this case, the phrase was altered to "many people [honorific form]" (*ōku no katagata*). *Asahi Shimbun* (September 4, 1993), p. 13. The inclusion of the dead of Korean or Taiwanese origin displays an ironic willingness to count such persons as Japanese if they are dead (see , below).

²*Asahi Shimbun* (August 17, 1993), pp. 1 and 3.

the unequivocal characterization of the war as one of aggression, a wrongful war.³ By August 23, on the occasion of his first policy address opening Parliament, criticism from the now opposition Liberal-Democrats as well as bereaved families forced him to avoid reference to a war of aggression, but he nevertheless managed to express "deep reflection upon [*hansei*] and apologies [*owabi*] for the unbearable suffering and sorrow inflicted upon many by the acts of aggression and colonial rule" engaged in by Japan.⁴ Later in the fall, on a trip to Seoul, he would become more daringly specific about the subjects of critical Japanese self-reflection.

How will posterity, reading these unremarkable words—modest tokens of belated recognition of the obvious—grasp something of their moment? That they exacted extravagant coordination and provoked passionate refusal and embrace?⁵ How should we apprehend the clotted conditions of Japanese historical memory in the postwar period today? Hosokawa's words marked a rupture. Vis-à-vis the past, it produced a horizon of national truth to have the Japanese head of state acknowledge what had been blusteringly denied through the postwar decades celebrating Japan's miraculous rebirth from the ashes of defeat. For the present and future, it broadened the conditions of Japanese citizenship to have nationally self-critical words uttered authoritatively (representatively) in public, especially weighted on the occasion of ritual consecration of the memory of the war to the consolation of heroically sacrificed Japanese souls.

As the words of apology and critical reflection accumulated, what had been official blasphemy seemed to become, overnight, commonsense: Japan had been a colonialist nation, it had conducted a war of aggression, and it had thereby inflicted suffering on non-Japanese as well as its own nationals. There will, to be sure, continue to be sniping and whimpering at this national betrayal, but it seems reasonable to assume that a line of

³get from paper or, quoted in Fukatsu Masumi, "Uha Ideogiji wo Tsūgekishita Shinryaku Sensō Hatsugen," *Gekkan Asahi* (December, 1993), p. 34.

⁴*Yomiuri Shimbun* (August 24, 1994), p. 4.

⁵For samplings of praise from those Asian neighbors, see *Asahi Shimbun* (August 17, 1994) p. 6.

historical understanding has been drawn that will be the basis of future words and deeds. This is an undeniably welcome advent; and yet it was accompanied by, or rather, itself produced, almost simultaneously and no doubt inevitably, a sense of letdown. Why this should be so is the question that triggered the considerations in this presentation.

Some of the answers are obvious and accrue to the actualization of long-awaited events in general: most especially this, that the realized object of longing, whether person, thing, event, or condition, can never match the overdetermined intensity of its state of unfulfillment. All the years of struggle on the sidelines (on the borders of Japanese-ness) by various citizens' groups and intellectuals speaking individually and collectively and protests from abroad [need to qualify and develop] were abruptly consummated in and cancelled by the Prime Minister's words. Here again there are general and specific conditions in play, which might be provisionally summarized as apology's nature as recognition of an irredeemable past, a recognition that is also payment for wrongs that then makes possible future interaction. When the wrongs in question were committed by a nation [upon citizens of other nations *and* its own: here, need to develop notion that "traditional" memorial services have not fulfilled the need of leadership to apologize to Japanese citizens, both victimized citizens and "compulsory" victimizers in the army], it stands to reason that the apology of the head of state is a necessary though not sufficient condition for that necessarily mythical thing, the adequate apology. The commensurability (representativity) of the head-of-state's apology to the popular energy that had led to it becomes an acute issue in democratic societies: even though the consummation-cancellation effect of the apology still pertains, the worth of the apology itself, as measured by its credible sincerity, increases where there is consonance between the representative's personal history and that of the movement leading to the official apology. [It's impossible to get out of language of value; cf Bush as signer of JA redress apologies] Finally, in a different direction, the worth of apology increases in inverse proportion to its instrumentality: to put it realistically, the more distant the link between apologizing for

historical wrongs and the realization of practical (political and especially economic) benefits from the apology, the greater its apparent sincerity.

How do Prime Minister Hosokawa's words measure up in this context? His own background [can elaborate] makes him at most a neutral enunciator of national apology. That his performance had as much impact as it did, that the aura of opportunism was as muted as it was, attests at once to the bankrupt state of Japanese politics [that someone of Hosokawa's background should be a plausible leader of reform] and the irreducible justice of the demand for Japanese apology. Nevertheless, the suspension of disbelief about the interestedness of this policy, namely, its lubrication of the path for furthering the already prospering co-prosperity sphere [need to point out the self-interest of heads-of-state who "receive" apology as well], can only be effected fleetingly. And the brevity of this moment inheres in part in the very medium that makes the national apology available to the citizens in the name of whom the apology is being offered—the intimate yet alien, disposable instruments of mass communication. Thus, the words of apology come to circulate as commodities to be consumed by apologizers and apologizees alike.

It is, in short, difficult to protect the sphere of apology from the contamination of the economic. That this is, in a complicated sense, not even desirable becomes evident if we consider the apologizees' position and acknowledge the need for compensation, a need, however, that issues from the apologizers as well. The more we consider the act of apology, the more we abut constitutive contradictions. Where the apology involves nations, and therefore heads of state and ordinary citizens; history, and therefore different generations of apologizers and victims [think about how to address asymmetry of speech act: heads of state to heads of state, not to, e.g., comfort women themselves]; war, and therefore exaggerated displays of maleness and femaleness, the contradictions multiply dizzyingly. I want to reflect on the meaning of the process of apology begun by Prime Minister Hosokawa in the memorial season of 1993, to see, more precisely, how it might be sustained as a process. My focus will be on the possibilities of this process of collective

historical encounter for the present and future of ordinary Japanese citizens (though I hope there will be resonances for all concerned with participation in a global historical process of meaningful reflection and action), but I will be aided in this thinking by the at once paradigmatic and exceptional [?] case of comfort women [Korean and Resident Korean because of limits of own knowledge].

Revisiting Japanese Reflections on Responsibility for the War [not war "guilt"]

Apologizing is closely related to taking responsibility. Part of the prehistory of the autumn apologies is, therefore, the history of discussions as to who should take responsibility for the war. The parameters of this discussion were set early, implicitly at least a year before surrender by imperatives being defined within the U.S. independently and to some degree in negotiation with its allies on the one hand (strategic use of Japan as a regional cornerstone in the postwar world order) and within the Japanese leadership (preservation of the kokutai, i.e., the emperor system) on the other; explicitly in the immediate postwar period by the American decision to use the emperor to facilitate occupation, meaning that he would neither be tried nor summoned as witness, and by the call of the Higashikuni cabinet for the entire population to repent (ichioku sôzange). The combined effect of affirming the emperor's nonresponsibility and the people's uniform responsibility (to put too strong a gloss on the sublimely ambiguous notion of penitence, equally deployable to regret loss of the war as well as having embarked upon it) fatally constricted the possibilities for collective thoughtfulness on the issue of responsibility. In the initial period of reflection on the war, the Tokyo Trial, in addition to leaving the emperor exempt, usefully segregated the military leadership, especially Tôjô Hideki, as culprits.⁶ From this distance it is perhaps too easy to see how the pacifism issuing all but naturally from the devastation of war, codified in Article 9 of the new Constitution, was

⁶A voice actor playing Tôjô's part in a radio show, "Shinsô wa kô da," hate mail by the bundle. In Hosaka Masayasu, *Tôjô Hideki to Tennô no Jidai*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Dentô to Gendaisha, 1980), pp. 169-70, cited in Onuma Yasuaki, *Sensô Sekininron kara Sengo Sekinin no Shisô E* (Tokyo: Yûshindô Kôbunsha, 1985), p. 191, n. 12.

qualitatively limited by the availability of identifiable culprits. That is to say, beyond recognizing the indisputable justness of pacifism as a response to the horrors of war, it is necessary to see how this pacifism emerged from and reinforced the identity of Japanese as victims. As the postwar years wore on, the structural premise behind the Tokyo Trial was contested as "victor's justice," and the specific hypocrasies and errors of the Trial as well as of the numerous overseas trials of Class B and C war criminals surfaced on the national consciousness.⁷ The war crimes trials themselves became one of the evils reinforcing the pacifist impulse and with it, the identity of victimization. They served to forestall, in other words, either consideration of Japan as an aggressor nation in Asia or of more nuanced and therefore penetrating forms of general responsibility (in contrast to the facile notion of communal penitence).⁸

In the meanwhile, in the immediate postwar years, intellectuals, especially writers, engaged in their own battles to cleanse their ambivalent records, to exchange charges and countercharges of apostasy. Even in the more productive mode of passionate debate over questions such as the construction of subjectivity, intellectual efforts had, not surprisingly, little effect on national consciousness of responsibility for the war.⁹ It is, of course, the

⁷Richard Minear's book; date for *Watashi wa Kai ni Naritai* (?) (underscore importance of Onuma's work, above, which attempts to reclaim lessons of Tokyo Trial for Japanese progressives without denying injustice of "victor's justice")

⁸It would be hard to put this issue better than Jürgen Habermas has done in "Defusing the Past" in Geoffrey Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 46: "It was as if Karl Jaspers had never made the trenchant distinction, almost four decades earlier, between a guilt for which there is only individual responsibility, and a communal liability for crimes that could not have been committed without collective silence. Today, no one still subscribes to the thesis of collective guilt. Those who nevertheless continue to argue against it are setting up a false assumption, which intends only to distract from the issue at hand, namely, the problem of what position we should take toward both the good and the bad aspects of our own past."

⁹[by contrast with widespread effects of reformed education, place of JTU, etc.] In English, see J. Victor Koschmann, "Maruyama Masao and the Incomplete Project of Modernity" in Masao Miyoshi and H.D. Harootyan, eds., *Postmodernism and Japan* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 123-141 as well as [Koschmann in Gordon]. Many of the essays in Tetsuo Najita, Maeda Ai, and Kimishima Jirō, eds., *Sengo Nihon no Seishinshi: Sono Saikentō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shotē, 1988) are helpful. See especially Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Sengo Shisō to Takeuchi Yoshimi," pp. 165-88; on subjectivity, Koschmann, "Sengo Shoki ni Okeru Hihanteki Marukusushugi no Unmei: Umemoto Katsumi no Shutaiseiron," pp. 145-164; on literary debates, Watanabe Kazutami, "Sengo Shisō no Mitorizu," pp. 95-111. Onuma Yasuaki's lucid discussion of the legacy of the Tokyo Trial, is scathing on Maruyama's easy condemnation of the incoherent smallness of Japanese fascism, especially as exemplified by Tōjō, in contrast to which a Goerring becomes appealing for his self-conscious lucidity (*ibid.*, pp. 144-45). Also see Yoshimoto, *Maruyama Masaoron*.

self-indulgence and hypocrisy of intellectual discourse on the war that became the target of the poet-philosopher Yoshimoto Takaaki in his influential work of the mid50s that were to so profoundly affect, not his beloved masses, to be sure, but enormous numbers of students of the New Left.¹⁰ The scale of the anti-U.S.-Japan Security Treaty renewal movement of 1960 [n.b., this attracted far more than students: 200,000-300,000 demonstrating at Diet per day] and 1970 (Ampo) attested to the strength of the pacifism spawned in the wake of the war, a pacifism that was to develop in the course of the decade with mounting opposition to the Vietnam War. The question is, was this pacificism being qualitatively elaborated? No doubt, widespread opposition to the Vietnam War had the effect of turning Japanese eyes sympathetically to Asia for the first time since the war, and student contestation of the hierarchically bureaucratized, instrumental education complicitous with the growing military-industrial Japanese state, as well as flourishing citizens' movements updated and briefly enriched that pacificism. Perhaps the past was too past in any case for a citizenry coercively and/or unreflectively busy within high growth economics; or there was simply no trigger to occasion reconsideration, in the light of American aggression in southeast Asia, Japan's own role in that region.¹¹ It is also likely that the (understandable) anti-Americanism that had pushed left and liberal parties and other organizations toward a certain nationalism since the early 50s was reinforced by Vietnam and contributed to freezing examination of Japanese wartime history. [cf Germany's new left anti-americanism and consequences for holocaust memory]

¹⁰With Takei Akio, *Bungakusha no Sensô Sekinin* (? 1956); "Tenkôron", etc.

¹¹It would be wrong to discuss postwar Japanese cultural and political interest in Asia without mentioning Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910-1977), the distinguished scholar of Chinese literature. He antedated Yoshimoto in focusing on the masses (though they are construed as "national subjects" [*kokumin*] in contrast to Yoshimoto's *minshû* and latter, *masu*), in calling for a "national people's literature" beginning in 1952. His efforts to disarticulate the re(turn) to Asia from the program of total war in the 1941 debate, "Overcoming Modernity," and to prophetically analyze the stakes in such a shift of direction for Japan, find sustained expression in the 1959 essay, "Kindai no Chôkoku" and the 1961 "Hôhō to shite no Ajia," both included in the collection, *Kindai no Chôkoku* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô, 1983), pp. 53-138. See Matsumoto Sannosuke's essay cited above as well as H. D. Harootunian, "Visible Discourses, Invisible Ideologies," in *Postmodernism and Japan*, pp. 63-92. As far as I can tell, one of the effects this work did not have was to hasten reflection on Japan's role as aggressor in Asia. Is this a question of timing? Did he excessively metaphorize Asia ("Asia as method")? Or?

Another Postwar History

It is indispensable to pause briefly over postwar Japanese busy-ness. That history, at least in thumbnail sketch, is familiar. The Korean War kicked Japan into recovery and growth. The economy took off and became so strong that it seemed to take even the first oil shock in stride. The Vietnam War made its contributions. Japan began to expand into euroamerican markets. The "Peace Constitution" was good for the economy; instead of sacrificing time to military service, young men (and women) dedicated their lives from childhood to retirement to the business of Japan, which was ... business, or training for business (education as totality).

In the meanwhile it was not as if Japan were ignoring its Asian neighbors. For one thing, the bilateral San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 left Japan to negotiate a series of individual settlements. After completing extremely favorable negotiations with the western Allies whereby all reparations were to be paid in the form of services, Japan dealt with Burma (1954), the Philippines (1956), Indonesia (1958), and South Vietnam (1959), which by contrast demanded monetary payment. These Japan paid at an extremely reduced rate—for example, at .07% in the case of the Philippines. If the Philippines' request of 80 billion dollars were converted by current exchange rates, the sum would equal approximately half the amount budgeted in 1993 for veterans' pensions, assistance to injured and ill veterans, and benefits to bereaved families.¹² (It should be recalled that Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese who had been conscripted into the Japanese Army were held liable for their war crimes as Japanese nationals but unqualified for benefits once stripped of their Japanese citizenship after the San Francisco Peace Treaty.)¹³ As is more often observed in progressive publications in recent years, what payments were made paved the way for the penetration of Japanese capital, as such payments were often used to

¹²Arai Shin'ichi, "Nihon no Sengo Hoshō o Kangaeru Yōgoshū," in *Gendai Yōgo no Kisoteki Chishiki* (Tokyo: Jiyū Kokuminsha, 1994), p. 21.

¹³After protracted legal battle, however, a group of Taiwanese veterans, civilians, and bereaved families received an average payment of 20 thousand dollars in 1992. (*Ibid.*, p. 22.)

purchase the products of Japanese industry. Until the 1960s Asian states that made arrangements for reparation or quasi-reparation payments were usually in desperate straits to reconstruct themselves; hungry for whatever Japanese funds they could garner, they signed off without provision for compensation to individual nationals.¹⁴ It would not be surprising, then, if such payments were made not only without a nominal sense of apology but even without bitterness, perhaps as an earlier, more modest version of the magnanimous investments that are Japanese ODA (overseas development assistance) payments of the past decade and more.¹⁵

In the cases of China and Korea, however, the restoration of diplomatic ties has been accompanied by exquisitely deliberate *expressions* of regret [*ikan*] and avowals of self-examination [*hansei*]. [give account of Taiwan, '52; ROK, '65; PRC, '72; need to make clear non-recognition of history of colonialism and unwillingness to pay reparations or compensation; cf. Wada Haruki, "Chôsen Shokuminchi Shihai no Shazai to Seisan O," in Sengo Hoshô Mondai Renraku linkai, ed., *Chôsen Shokuminchi Shihai to Sengo Hoshô*, Iwanami Booklet no. 260 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), pp. 56-61. Situate textbook controversy of '82 here: apology & education; false textual teachings v persons enunciating/demanding recognition of truth]

Prosperity as Redemption, Payment as [Truth? Proof? i.e., guarantor of sincerity]

Let us return to the words offered at the forty-eighth memorial service. The Emperor's words are literally described as "words" (with honorific embellishment: *okotoba*), as they are on any public occasion. After expressing his renewed "deep sorrow" over the many who had lost their lives in the world war and their families, he proceeds:

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁵Fresh figures: "Eighty percent of Japan's bilateral loan assistance goes to neighbors in which Japanese businesses have the greatest interest. (A lower percentage of Japan's official development assistance is in the form of actual grants than for any of the eighteen countries which make up the Development Assistance committee of the OECD.) The loans are typically for infrastructure development to facilitate trade with Japan." William Tabb, "Japanese Capitalism and Asian Geese," *Monthly Review*, vol. 45, 10 (March 1994), p. 35.

Forty-eight years have already gone by since the end of the war, and thanks to the ceaseless efforts of the people, the peace and prosperity of our country have been established, but in recalling the times of ordeal, my emotions know no end.

The brief address concludes with a prayer for "world peace and the still greater development of our nation."¹⁶

After extending condolences to Japan's Asian neighbors, Prime Minister Hosokawa's "address" (*shikiji*) continues with

Since the war our country desiring lasting peace, has overcome numerous difficulties, and thanks to the ceaseless efforts of the people, it has achieved a startling degree of development. It is especially in the peaceful and prosperous present that, along with recounting the precious sacrifice of the war dead to the young generations, we renew our pledge to never repeat the ravages of war.¹⁷

Speaker of the House Doi Takako, former chair of the Japan Socialist Party, extensively revised the text that had been prepared for her "address of mourning" (*tsuitô no shikiji*). After concrete references to "mutual" (*higa*) suffering, she continues,

Since the war our country has achieved remarkable economic development, and now it has arrived at a point where it occupies an important position in international society. This is solely the result of each one of our people thinking of the tragic war, reflecting (*hansei*) on the errors of her and his history, and based on the resolve to never repeat those errors, exerting themselves toward regeneration as a nation of peace.¹⁸

These addresses bear comparison on several grounds [e.g., verbal forms; Doi's is the only one to use personal pronoun though grammatical person contained in use of desu/masu form by each], but for the moment let us note the yoking of suffering, peace, and prosperity in each. It is starkest in the Emperor's address, in part because it is the shortest

¹⁶*Asahi Shimbun* (August 17, p. 3).

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.* On revisions, *ibid.*, p. 22.

by far (and not by accident, according to the scarcity principle of value), but also because his role to date has evidently required minimal intimation of Japanese *responsibility* for suffering in the war. [check wording to Roh Tae-woo as well as on SE Asian trip in '91; why ROK not on itinerary yet; sticks and stones] In all three cases the linkage of the three terms is richly underspecified, leaving room for different listeners to articulate them according to their own most compelling interpretive desires. The most conservative and all but (postwar) traditional reading that is presumably the most comfortable to the mourners in attendance would make the suffering the direct *cause* of present day peace-and-prosperity (perceived as one unit, the prosperity making the peace apprehendable?). In this way the death of loved ones is redeemed: thanks to their sacrifice, we prosper today. Both Hosokawa and Doi attempt to mediate this linkage: it is not that suffering has directly produced prosperity (as if recovery from the ashes of war were assimilable to a Horatio Alger narrative) but that recollection and narration of the suffering, and based on these acts, renewed resolve to avert war, have produced present day peace-and-prosperity.¹⁹

But the peace-and-prosperity linkage remains unexamined by both, for a myriad overlapping and contrasting reasons. It cannot be, given the time constraints of the occasion, and usefully so. There is no question that the "Peace Constitution" has benefited Japan's economy, or that the preservation of Article 9 deserves the most sustained efforts (sacrifice?) on the part of Japanese citizens. It is incumbent upon us, however, to supply the other than peaceful aspects of the content and context of postwar Japanese prosperity. There is the historical reminder of the profits derived by the Japanese economy from the two great Asian wars of the Japanese postwar, namely, the Korean and the Vietnam Wars. There is the ongoing reality (despite the recession) of so many Japanese living their prosperity in terms of the "civilized horrors of overwork" [Marx; complete quote] while

¹⁹For his first parliamentary address on August 23, however, Hosokawa not only changed the phrasing "war of aggression" (*shinryaku sensô*) to "acts of aggression" (*shinryaku kôgi*), but added the wording of "... the prosperity and peace our country enjoys ... were built on the precious sacrifices of the world war." *Yomiuri Shimbun* (August 24, 1993), p. 4.

elsewhere in the economic co-prosperity sphere those horrors slip from the civilized to the realm of the barbarous [environmental degradation, absence of labor rights, etc.]. Perhaps, in order to incite the energy of the great numbers of Japanese citizenry required to safeguard the imperiled "no-war" clause, it is necessary to gloss peace as prosperity without scrutinizing the character of that prosperity (and therefore of that peace). At least, for the moment: to gain the time for public reflection before all constraints have been removed and the seduction of economic recovery through military expenditure looms naked.*** {Bruce—I'm not unimpressed by the arguments of Wada Haruki and his group that Article 9 should be revised to stipulate an armed forces that could only be defensive; I don't know how you do that, though: do you?}

The importance of preserving the suffering-peace-prosperity linkage so that it can serve as the basis of redemptive and emancipatory thought and action is revealed by efforts to rupture it. After the series of addresses in which he referred to Japan's role as aggressor and colonial occupier, Hosokawa clarified to Parliament that he had not made those statements with compensation in mind: "our country has dealt sincerely with [the issue of compensation] according to such [agreements] as the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and I do not have in mind any legal reconsideration."²⁰ This position is consistent with that adopted by predecessor LDP governments. Whether Japan has in fact put paid to all questions of compensation in the series of bilateral agreements signed to date is entirely debatable.²¹ Minimally, this is cannot be the case with the DPRK nor with Taiwan, with whom Japan ceased to have diplomatic ties upon the restoration of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972. In the case of comfort women, however, whose existence it is alleged was unknown at the time of the normalization treaty signed with the ROK in 1965, there are some in the foreign ministry who think that a mechanism is necessary from a "humanitarian" point of view; but there are others in the same ministry who worry that once payments are made to

²⁰ *Asahi Shimbun* (August 26, 1993), p. 1.

²¹ See Arai, "Nihon no Sengo Hoshō o Kangaeru Yōgoshū"; *Asahi Shimbun* (August 24, 1993), p. 2.

comfort women, then Koreans who have come forth for compensation for forcible removal and corvée or Indonesians who were forced to serve as assistants [*heiho*] to the Japanese Army, and who knew how many others would demand payment, and it would be difficult to draw the perennial line.²² In the meanwhile the Japanese half (headed by none other than former prime minister Takeshita Noboru) of a multi-party association of Korean-Japanese parliamentarians has proposed establishing some sort of funding mechanism in the place of compensation to accompany formal apology to the comfort women.²³ Within Hosokawa's own cabinet, the Socialists have shown signs of strong commitment to payment of compensations [Yamahana on trip to Seoul in September; of course, Socialists have their reasons given history of nonrelations with ROK]; and on August 30, a group of women parliamentarians presented a petition with thirty-two signatures (including that of Kubota Manaë, head of the Economic Planning Agency) calling for the payment of compensations to comfort women, the establishment of an office to research the facts of the case, and the transmission of the findings through textbooks and historical museums. Cabinet Secretary Takemura Masayoshi could only reiterate that the case was closed on compensation, but that the government would have to find a "means of apologizing to each one."²⁴

The case becomes more complicated as we take into account the Korean response as represented by President Kim Young-sam on the occasion of Hosokawa's visit to Seoul in November of 1993. On that occasion Hosokawa made the most explicit references to and apologies for Japan's colonial rule. He called Japan the aggressor (literally, the inflictor of harm, *kagaisha*) and listed examples of "unbearable suffering" inflicted as follows: the robbing of the opportunity to learn the mother tongue in school; the transformation of family names into Japanese-style names; comfort women, the

²²Ibid. And indeed, following the series of Hosokawa statements, groups in the Philippines and Malaysia have begun to seek compensation more actively. *Yomiuri Shimbun* (August 21, 1993), p. 2.

²³*Asahi Shimbun* (August 26, 1993), p. 2. Former Prime Minister Miyazawa had suggested the same. Cf. German fund established for Poland.

²⁴*Yomiuri Shimbun* (August 31, 1993), p. 3.

commandeering of labor.²⁵ Kim praised Hosokawa's "historical understanding" and contrasted his own administration with his predecessor's in not seeking compensation from the Japanese government: they were taking their "own" (*dokuji na*) steps. During their conference, Kim expressed his hopes for continued close U.S.-Japan-ROK ties on the North Korean nuclear issue, revitalized Japanese-Korean economic deliberations, increased Japanese investments, and more open Japanese markets in construction. The question of an alternative fund for comfort women did not come up.²⁶

What are the tangled motives on either side? An LDP foreign affairs expert criticized Hosokawa for saying too much: "I think it's better to apologize to a certain extent, but the Prime Minister didn't need to go into so much detail about the past."²⁷ Is this struggle over words or money? Does a Japanese prime minister have to be parsimonious with his words because if he says too much the nation will have to pay for it? If Japanese peace in its incarnation as prosperity is inseparable from Japanese suffering, and if one is acknowledging and apologizing for profound suffering wrought by Japanese upon those who were once forcibly counted as Japanese, shouldn't part of that prosperity be shared with these sufferers [qua suffering individuals, rather than to their government or major corporations]? Isn't the current denial of compensation — not just for comfort women — simply a continuation of the policy whereby the occupants of Japan's colonies were counted for services (and attendant punishment) but not for protection or reward? [but need to break the logic of colonialism: need new principle] If so, how can we accord any credibility to the gestures of acknowledgement and apology? In addition to sheer political expediency [about which should say more], aren't historical pride and national purse compensating for each other in obstructing the execution of meaningful apology? Which is to say, also, that Japanese citizens are prevented from grappling with what might be at stake beyond verbal cavil and shameful thrift? [explain; not that will make either/or

²⁵*Asahi Shimbun* (November 7, 1993), p. 1.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷Kosugi Takashi (?), *ibid.*, p. 23.

argument, certainly not one that's uniformly applicable to all Japanese; need to sort out and articulate levels of analysis]

On the Korean side, it is difficult not to detect a patriarchal-national pride in the refusal of compensation for comfort women. It is, to be sure, an effort by the new government to distinguish itself from its predecessor, but why should it come in this aspect of bilateral relations? [what are other significant differences? is there any talk of support for other categories now coming forth with demands for compensation from Japan?] This is a complicated gesture. It is perhaps more consoling for women ravaged by enemy men to be cared for by their own [men in this case: it's one of the tragicomically {?} awkward aspects of Kim-Hosokawa meeting that these two men are trading words about women that both probably wish didn't exist]; but isn't it important to disrupt a patriarchal-nationalist (and politically expedient—i.e., there are other things the ROK government would rather get out of Japan now?) logic with a discourse of rights [and here money becomes crucial; need to acknowledge how that discourse emerges from Enlightenment capitalism, i.e., private property as basis for rights]—for men and women?²⁸ And for Japanese as well as Koreans? For if it is one thing for the Korean head of state to be refusing money for his ravaged countrywomen, it is disingenuous for Japanese to demur about establishing even an alternative fund because they might be accused of trying to resolve what had been called "a matter of the heart (*kokoro*) [who says?]" with money, *even though* that may be the case.²⁹

These complications become intensified if we move closer in, to the former comfort women and their support groups. The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Service by Japan [Teitaiikyô], a federation of Korean support groups, has made seven demands of the Japanese government:

²⁸Is the Korean government able/willing to support these women? Cf fundraising efforts to establish a residence/clinic/archives in a suburb of Seoul. Pamphlet distributed in conjunction with performances in Yokohama and Tokyo (November 11 and 13, 1993) of *Koe Naki Banka* (pp. 13-14). States government only has rental housing units available.

²⁹*Yomiuri Shimbun* (August 21, 1993), p. 3.

- (1) to bring to light the facts of the case of "military comfort women"
- (2) to make public all the circumstances surrounding "military comfort women"
- (3) to apologize
- (4) to make reparations [*baishō*] to the victims and their bereaved families
- (5) to erect a memorial marker to the victims (*tsuibohi*)
- (6) to include accounts in history textbooks and to educate [the young]
- (7) to punish war criminals [need to say something about Class B & C war criminals?]

The establishment of an alternative fund is rejected as an attempt to take advantage of the comfort women's medical and daily life needs and, in the process, to minimize, to conceal Japanese crimes and yes, to aim for a speedy resolution through money. It is the duty of the Korean people and government to console and sustain the former comfort women, to which end fundraising is being actively conducted. This, it is emphasized, is the only way to recover the pride of the former comfort women and of the Korean people [*minzoku*].³⁰

Though it is unclear from this brief document what is to be done with reparations [is translation as *baishō*, reparations, deliberate? important issue; ask Takagi?] from the Japanese government [does anybody know?], if the daily needs of the former comfort women are to be met by Korean funds, the important point seems to be that such money as comes from the Japanese government is to be claimed and won, not given and received. It is as if money that is wrested is decontaminated, transmogrified, [somehow symmetrical to original wrong: these women were sex slaves—i.e., weren't paid; so payment shouldn't come qua money 50 years late] The point, of course, is that money is not the point, but this has the vexing (?) effect of underscoring the place of money. In the case of [Son Shin-do, the first Resident Korean former comfort woman to bring suit in the Tokyo District?], Court, her lawyers have demanded an apology from Parliament and left unspecified the amount of compensation sought on the grounds of the impossibility of quantifying the

³⁰*Koe Naki Banka*, pp. 18-19.

damage and therefore seeking initiative [*shutaitekini*] on the part of the state to award the maximum possible.³¹ One Japanese woman lawyer writing on comfort women cases makes the point that for an established wrong, there must be compensation. Museums to memorialize and transmit the history and facilities for their care are necessary but insufficient. Without payment of compensation to the wronged individual (in contrast to the alternative fund to be paid out to a government), the meaning of atonement [*tsugunai*] is lost.³² [significant differences here that require unpacking]

Apology as Speech Act

[In this section I originally intended to take the separation of words and money seriously, at least provisionally, and pursue J.L. Austin's notion of performatives to clarify this matter. {*How To Do Things with Words*, 2d ed., J.O. Urmson and Maria Sbisà (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1975)} He sets out two contrastive groups of language use, constatives and performatives; if the distinction of truth/falsehood is applicable to the former, it is not to the latter, whose defining feature is that the utterance is the act (and therefore to be judged in terms of felicity/infelicity). Eventually, Austin seems to find that all utterances fall into the performative category, which literary deconstructionists such as Shoshana Felman delight in exploiting. But before he gets there, he singles out apologies, but especially, promises, as paradigmatic performative speech acts. This is telling. The felicity/infelicity principle becomes quite weighty; I want to argue that for performatives to work, i.e., be "felicitous," they require acts beyond the utterance. This would suggest, for instance, that an apology cannot be "sincere" in and of itself.

I then want to sociologize the speech act model after Bourdieu ("The Economics of Linguistics Exchange," *Social Science Information* 16 (June, 1977), pp. 645-668) and apply the model of Japanese grammarian Tokieda Motoki developed in his *Kokugogaku*

³¹ *Asahi Shimbun* (evening edition; September 21, 1993) [get page number]

³² Fukushima Ruric in *ibid.* (September 22, 1993) [get page number: rondan]

Genron (Iwanami: 1941). Tokieda was critiquing Saussure's choice of systematic *langue* over specific *parole* as the object of his study; Tokieda wanted to emphasize the dynamic subjectivity of the subject of the utterance and of the addressee: someone speaks to someone about something. I want to try plugging in some of the actors into this (by now highly modified model). I come back to the issues of representation and relative power. What does it mean to have heads of state, themselves too young to have been party to the acts in question, to be the addressor and addressee of apology? (Should this be the place to address apologies as diplomatic tools, scrutinized by governments not for apologetic content per se?) That they are male, in this case? That with descending power comes increasing intensity of apology (Doi, Yamahana; cf Weizsäcker's address to Bundestag)? This can be the place to bring in lowly veterans who can see the point of Hosokawa & Doi's memorial addresses but resent the use of "we" in Doi's apology because the sense of their own (coerced) suffering is overpowering, conversely, young Japanese who feel no need to participate in national apology because they weren't yet born. Need to expand notion of responsibility: not just for historical event, i.e., something past, but for the present that in many ways grows out of that past; in Onuma's words, responsibility for the postwar rather than for the war. Also consider relationship of support groups to former comfort women. Speaking for, making totemic animal, political conscience]

Apology as Gift

[If the above section explores the apology as speech act that is constituted by differential relationships of power and strategic forms of representation that are also instances of exclusion, I want to use another model here to explore the longing to separate out the instrumental from the apology, to make it pure and therefore authentic, sincere. I'll work with Marcel Mauss's *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies* (New York: Norton, 1967). Mauss understood that gift exchange was not entirely without interest, but he still considered it to be noncalculating, noneconomical, nonindividual—definitely out of the realm of the commodity. He wanted to see vestiges of this mode in

modern society, too. (Is this the place to take up cultural notions of apology, such as Benedict's, or Barthes on Japan as surface ... I tend to think they're irrelevant, or rather, ideologically obscurantist, but perhaps need to say so somewhere.)

Need to clarify what I'm calling gift; is it just the words of apology? what about the ex-comfort women's "sacrifice"? Do they make up the items of circulation? Need to build this on to analysis of previous section.]

Words and Money in Utopian Conjunction

[start out with other instances of apologies: Yeltsin, bribers, failures (taking responsibility more often used to take form of suicide); check Minamata; what US will do with radiation experiment disclosures; redress; Weizsäcker — spoke at such length! unimaginable in Japan — why?

Hartmann on education and ritual as necessary to keep alive memory/lessons of Holocaust; analogous to words and money; use Marx and especially Simmel on money and personhood (owning as being); Resident Korean plaintiff's fantasy of having money to give away; activist groups shouldn't become owners of their totemic conscience-bearer (Rodinson on ideological fetishism of oppression); finally, Goux on postweberian capitalism and utopian dream: not to collapse everyday life and intensified moments, but to find channels of connection)

Have to admit this paper is japanocentric: i.e., I'm concerned with political salvation of Japanese citizens; this makes me ride roughshod over Korean support-group movement, for instance; also, need to be more alert to differences between Korean and Resident Korean/support group desires & styles. How to do this? That is, how to acknowledge rootedness in particularity but still seeking broader principles?]